Building the Trades
The Local Hire Mandate | The Local Hire Mandate |
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Political power radiates from any single idea that claims to achieve these things, no matter how dubious that idea when closely examined. A complex of small but effective steps, on the other hand, will never fit on a sticker. At this writing, legislation mandating an eventual 50 percent local hire on city-funded work has been approved by an 8-3 vote of the Board of Supervisors. It must pass through a second vote next week, 14 December. Its passage is certain. The legislation’s slogan fits nicely on a sticker. The legislation was sold to the unemployed as “stimulus.” Instead of ending when the present crisis has passed, though, as true stimulus legislation would, it increases its demands over time.
It was sold to the underprivileged by talking of 6,000 jobs a year on average for the next 10 years, 3,000 of which would in time be for local residents, an increase of 2,000 new jobs over the present 20 percent local hire performance. Instead, the City controller estimates that it will provide about 355 new jobs annually. It was sold to environmentalists as limiting commutes. Instead, it extends fully to all city-funded work up to 70 miles out, and partially to all city-funded work beyond that, and so sends City residents driving. I raise here an ethical objection to the legislation. I then comment on a detail of my discussion last month of the legislation’s mathematics in a way that actually somewhat favors its latest amended version. Next month I will discuss a series of steps that would be more effective than the legislation in achieving its goals, and without its trespass against the ethics of unionism. The Left Hand Shakes the RightIn times of desperation, the desperate seek any advantage; so also in desperate communities. In such times and places, exploiting division is always easier than building commonality. “They have what you should have” is strong argument to the ears of someone who has little. Unions have been guilty of this at times, but it has been a tool of politicians since the Athenian origins of democracy. The Avalos legislation pits worker against worker. It says that where one lives, and not who has been out of work longest, should determine who works. What is more, it does this even though its sponsor and advocates know that non-resident Hispanic workers form the single largest component of our unionized workforce. This is by any standard a minority workforce and from an underprivileged community. This is the very sort of workforce the sponsor and advocates claim to defend. Instead, they play minority against minority, underprivileged community against underprivileged community. They never needed to do this to increase access for residents of the City’s underprivileged communities to careers in our trades. Of course, those Hispanic workers, our union members, our brothers and sisters, non-resident and many of them non-citizen, cannot vote for Supervisor Avalos. This tactic of pitting worker against worker has belonged traditionally to employers and the political right. Lately, self-styled progressives have employed it. The left hand shakes the right. Public Defender Jeff Adachi’s recent Proposition B tried to turn private sector worker against public sector worker. Supervisor Avalos himself recently tried to pit the Fire Fighters and the Service Employees International Unions against each other, until the Labor Council persuaded him to back down. A former union organizer himself, Supervisor Avalos surely realizes what he is doing here. This makes his actions all the more saddening, and his responsibility all the greater. j / w = xRecall that in this formula from last month’s column, j stands for the total number of resident journeylevel workers, w for workforce demand in number of journeylevel workers on City-funded work, and x for percentage of journeylevel workers on City-funded work, expressed as a decimal factor. Recall also that w can vary as often as daily, and it is clear that there is no single correct percentage mandate to maximize local hire. Also, j is a maximum; the actual number of journeylevel resident workers available will face downward pressure by demand both from non-City-funded public work and from private sector work, whether local or regional. This demand, too, will vary as often as daily. More accurately, then, a theoretical correct percentage to maximize local hire would vary as often as daily. We have no way to track this. Even if we did, there is no practical way to put it into effect – unless anyone thinks that daily turnover in construction crews is practical. In mandating percentages of local hire without recognizing that they would often be unachievable even by a contractor doing everything it should, and in levying strong penalties for failure to comply, the original version of the legislation assured that contractors would build expected penalties into their bid prices. The amended legislation provides some relief valves for contractors who are doing everything possible to fulfill its mandates but are still falling short. While still pressing contractors to comply, it allows for the likelihood of occasional unavailability of resident workers. It can be seen as providing a very rough approximation of a maximization of local hire, although we cannot yet know if the relief valves are functional enough to prevent untenable increases in contracting costs. These relief valves, a slower phase-in of the eventual 50 percent mandate, and review periods at the third and sixth years make the legislation more survivable in the short term than it was. It still takes the wrong approach, in terms both of effectiveness and of ethics. It is not, however, the disaster it was. |
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